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ABSTRACT
The transportation sector accounts for nearly one third of the United States' greenhouse gas emissions.
While over the past number of decades, policy makers have avoided directly pricing the externalities
from vehicles, both in terms of global and more local pollutants and Corporate Average Fuel Standards
have changed little since the mid-1980s, there is now considerable interest in reducing greenhouse
gas emissions form the transportation sector. Many have argued that the unique features of the sector
imply that pricing mechanisms would have little affect on emissions.  This paper analyzes how pricing
carbon through either a cap and trade system or carbon tax might affect greenhouse gas emissions
from the transportation sector by estimating how changes in gasoline prices alter consumer behavior.
We analyze their effect on both the intensive (e.g., vehicle miles travelled) and extensive (e.g., vehicle
scrapping) margins. We find large effects on both margins.
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1 Introduction
The transportation sector accounts for nearly one third of the United States’ greenhouse gas emis-
sions. While over the past number of decades, policy makers have avoided directly pricing the
externalities from vehicles, both in terms of global and more local pollutants and Corporate Av-
erage Fuel Standards have changed little since the mid-1980s, there is now considerable interest
in reducing greenhouse gas emissions form the transportation sector. Many have argued that the
unique features of the sector imply that pricing mechanisms would have little affect on emissions.
This paper analyzes how pricing carbon through either a cap and trade system or carbon tax
might affect greenhouse gas emissions from the transportation sector. Pricing carbon can influence
emissions from the transportation sector in a number of ways. On the firm side, a positive carbon
price incentivizes firms to reduce lifecycle emissions from liquid fuels either through the refining
process or by switching to fuels that have a lower carbon content. Pricing carbon also incentivizes
automobile manufacturers to change their product mix. On the consumer side, pricing carbon
differentiates fuels by their carbon content, so consumers have an incentive to switch to cleaner
gasoline or alternative fuels. Consumers also have an incentive to drive more efficiently and to keep
their vehicles operating more efficiently. The scrapping decisions of consumers are also affected.
High mileage vehicles may stay on the roader longer as they become relatively more valuable, while
low mileage vehicles may exist faster. New vehicle decisions are also likely to change as consumers
switch to more fuel efficient vehicles. Finally, driving habits and trip decisions may also be affected,
reducing the number of miles vehicles are driven.
Existing work has focused on the extensive margin by estimating how changes in gas prices
affect what new cars people purchase and how scrappage decisions change. Using a single unique
data source, we focus on two influences: scrappage decisions and vehicle miles travelled. We both
summarize recent empirical work and present new results.
We bring together a number of unique data sets. The first is the universe of test records for
California’s emissions inspection and maintenance program, so-called smog tests, for the period
of 1996 to 2009. California requires vehicles older than six years to receive biennial testing. In
addition, testing occurs each time a vehicle changes ownership and randomly for a small share
of vehicles. Among other things, the inspection data report odometer readings, which we use to
measure vehicle miles travelled between tests. To measure greenhouse gas emissions, we link these
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data to EPA fuel economy ratings. In addition, the data are linked to EIA gas prices for the same
years.
Our work builds on a recent literature analyzing how changes in gasoline prices influence con-
sumer behavior. On the extensive margin, Busse, Knittel, and Zettelmeyer (2009) study purchase
decisions and dealer pricing decisions using transaction-level data for both new and used vehicles.
They find that increased gasoline prices influence both which vehicles consumers buy and the prices
they pay for them in both the new and used vehicle markets. Furthermore, market shares are most
influenced in the new vehicle market, while prices are most affected in the used market. Using
model-level registration data for twenty MSAs, Li, Timmins, and von Haefen (2009) finds higher
gas prices affect both new vehicle purchase decisions and used vehicle scrapping decisions. Hughes,
Knittel, and Sperling (2008) estimate the short run elasticity for gasoline and find that over time
elasticities have fallen.
Most of these papers use monthly variation in gasoline prices for their empirical results. There-
fore, their results are short run in nature. One of the contributions of this paper is that because
of the richness of our data, in particular a large number of individual decisions that take place
through out the year, we are able to estimate how changes in gas prices affect decisions that take
place within two-year intervals. That is, our empirical models estimate how miles driven decisions
over a two-year period are affected by changes in the average gas price throughout this entire pe-
riod. We are able to estimate this longer run elasticity because observe many two-year intervals
within our sample. To estimate a “two-year elasticity” with aggregate data would require a much
larger time series than we require.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical setting. The data are discussed
in Section 3. Section 4 provides graphical support for the two channels, while Section 5 presents
the empirical models and results. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Empirical Setting
Our empirical setting is California. Our primary data source is the universe of test data from
California’s Smog Check program from 1996 to 2010. California implemented its first inspection
and maintenance program in 1984 in response to the 1977 Clean Air Act amendments. The initial
incarnation of the Smog Check program relied purely on a decentralized system of privately run,
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state-licensed inspection stations, and was plagued by cheating and lax inspections. Although the
agreement between California and the federal EPA promised reductions in hydrocarbon and carbon
monoxide emissions of more the 25 percent, estimates of actual reductions of the early Smog Check
Program range from zero to half that amount (Glazer, Klein, and Lave (1995)).
The 1990 Clean Air Act amendments required states to implement an enhanced inspection and
maintenance program in areas with serious to extreme non-attainment of ozone limits. Several of
California’s urban areas fell into this category, and in 1994, a redesigned inspection program was
passed by California’s legislature after reaching a compromise with the EPA. The program was
updated in 1997 to address consumer complaints, and fully implemented by 1998. Among other
improvements, California’s new program introduced a system of centralized “Test-Only” stations
and an electronic transmission system for inspection reports.1 Today, more than a million Smog
Checks take place each month.
An automobile appears in our data for a number of reasons. First, vehicles that are older than
four years old must pass a smog test within 90 days of any change in ownership. Second, in parts of
the state (details below) an emissions inspection is required every other year as a pre-requisite for
renewing the registration on the vehicle for vehicles that are seven years or older. Third, a small
share of vehicles are randomly tested. Fourth, a test is required if a vehicle moves from out-of-state.
Finally, some vehicles are flagged as matching a High Emitter Profile (HEP) and must receive a
Smog Check every year before registering. Vehicles which fail an inspection must be repaired and
receive another inspection before they can be registered and driven in the state. There is also a
group of exempt vehicles. These are: vehicles of 1975 model-year or older, hybrid and electric
vehicles, motorcycles, diesel powered vehicles and large trucks powered by natural gas.
Since 1998, the state has been divided into three inspection regimes (recently expanded to
four), the boundaries of which roughly correspond to the jurisdiction of the Regional Air Quality
Management Districts. “Enhanced” regions, designated because they fail to meet state or federal
standards for carbon monoxide (CO) and ozone, fall under the most restrictive regime. All of the
state’s major urban centers are in Enhanced areas, including the greater Los Angeles, San Francisco,
and San Diego metropolitan areas. Vehicles that are seven years or older that are registered to an
address in an Enhanced area must pass a biennial Smog Check in order to be registered, and they
must take the more rigorous Acceleration Simulation Mode (ASM) test, which involves the use of a
1For more detailed background see http://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/smogcheck/july00/if.pdf.
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dynamometer. In addition, a randomly selected two percent sample of all vehicles in these areas is
directed to have their Smog Checks at so-called Test-Only stations, which are not allowed to make
repairs. HEP vehicles are also directed to Test-Only stations, as are vehicles which are flagged as
“gross polluters” (this occurs when a vehicle fails an inspection with twice the legal limit of one or
more pollutant in its emissions). More recently some “Partial-Enhanced” areas have been added,
where a biennial ASM test is required, but no vehicles are directed to Test-Only stations.
Areas with air pollution that does not exceed legal limits fall under the Basic regime. Cars in
a Basic area must have biennial Smog Checks as part of registration, but they are allowed to take
the more lax Two Speed Idle (TSI) test, and no vehicles are directed to Test-Only stations. The
least restrictive regime, consisting of rural mountain and desert counties in the east and north of
the state, is known as the Change of Ownership area. As the name suggests, inspections in these
areas are only required upon change of ownership; no biennial Smog Check is required.
3 Data
Our data come from the Bureau of Automotive Repair (BAR) and are the universe of smog tests
from 1996 to 2010 and report the location of the test, the vehicle’s VIN, odometer reading, the
reason for the test, and test results. We decode the VIN to obtain the vehicles’ make, model,
engine and transmission. Using this, we match the vehicles to EPA data on fuel economy. Because
the VIN decoding only holds for vehicles made after 1981, our data are restricted to these models,
although to date we have only matched the EPA data for model years 1984 to the present. We
also restrict our sample to 1998 and beyond given the large changes that occurred in 1997. This
yields roughly 120 million observations. For the analysis in this paper we use a random 10 percent
sample.
For biennial tests, we construct the average gasoline price between the two test data using EIA’s
national average prices.
4 Initial Evidence
Before discussing the econometric models and results, we provide graphical evidence suggesting
that increasing fuel prices affects both the intensive and extensive margins.
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4.1 Extensive Margin
Changes in the extensive margin will manifest themselves in changing the mix of vehicles that are
registered through both scrappage and new vehicle sales. We present evidence of both. Figure 1
plots both gas prices and the average fuel economy of newly registered vehicles within one year
of the current year. While the Smog Test program does not require dealers to test new vehicles,
tested vehicles within one year of the current year are likely to correlated well with new vehicle
sales as we are capturing changes in ownership and vehicles moving into California that are one or
two years old.2
From 1998 to 2004, there was a steady decrease in the fuel economy of new vehicles registered
in California. This corresponds to the increase in SUV sales and a period of relatively low gasoline
prices. As gasoline prices rose, however, this trend reversed. Remarkably, the trend again reversed
as gasoline prices began to fall in 2008. We take this as evidence, consistent with Busse, Knittel,
and Zettelmeyer (2009) that new vehicle sales respond to gasoline prices. Indeed, this figure extends
their analysis to include the drop in gasoline prices beginning in 2008.
As evidence that scrappage rates respond to gasoline prices, we plot the average fuel economy
of vehicles of a specific model year over time. If the scrappage rates of vehicles of a specific vintage
are independent of a vehicle’s fuel economy or gasoline prices, then the average fuel economy of a
particular model-year over time will be constant. There is reason to believe, however, that less fuel
efficient vehicles have lower hazard rates since trucks typically last longer than passenger cars.3
Figure 2 plots the average fuel economy of vehicles with model years of 1984, 1986, 1988, and
1990 being tested as part of either the random or biennial test programs, as well as gasoline prices.
The model years are old enough to be at risk of scrappage and required biennial Smog Checks in
each year of our data. All four model years, early in the sample, show a general decreasing trend
in fuel economy, consistent with the higher durability of low fuel economy vehicles. This trend
continues even as gasoline prices begin to rise in 2003. However, this trend appears to break and
in three of the four cases reverse the higher are gasoline prices.
2The graphs in this section smooth the series using a lowess smoothed line with a bandwidth equal to four months.
3Therefore, all else equal, we might expect the average fuel economy of a given model year to fall over time. See,
for example, Lu (2006) which finds different scrappage rates for cars and trucks.
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4.2 Intensive Margin
We present preliminary evidence that gasoline prices affect the intensive margin by plotting monthly
gas prices and the average miles driven (VMT) daily within a year (Figure 3). The figure suggests
that VMT rose from 1998 to 1999 and then began a steady decline. This corresponds to the period
where gasoline prices began to rise. We also see a small increase in VMT during 2009, which
corresponds to the decrease in gasoline prices, albeit with some lag. Figure 4 plots the distribution
of VMT in 1998 and 2008. The figure suggests an entire shift in the distribution over this time
period.
5 Empirical Models and Results
5.1 Extensive Margin
Our first empirical model, estimates the hazard rate of the decision to scrap a vehicle as a func-
tion of the cost per mile of the vehicle. We define a vehicle as being scrapped if it had a bien-
nial smog test in year X, but does not have another smog test by year X + 3. We estimate a
stratified discrete time Cox proportional hazard model. The stratified model allows the baseline
hazard to vary by groups, where we define groups by either the make of the vehicle or the spe-
cific make/model/engine/drivetrain/transmission. We also include a sixth-order polynomial in the
vehicle’s odometer, whether the vehicle previously failed a smog test, whether it was flagged as a
gross polluter, and separate vintage fixed effects for cars and trucks.
The key covariate is a vehicle’s cost per mile during the period after a biennial smog test. We
calculate the average gasoline price for the two years after the vehicle took the test and divide this
by its fuel economy rating. As gasoline prices increase, the cost of operating all vehicles increase.
All else equal, this will tend to increase the hazard rate for all vehicles. However, there is also a
more general equilibrium effect. Busse, Knittel, and Zettelmeyer (2009) find that prices for fuel
efficient vehicles increase as gasoline prices increases. This implies that as gasoline prices increase
the “continuation value” of fuel efficient vehicles might also increase, despite their increase in usage
costs. This may reduce the scrapping rates of these vehicles. For this reason, we separate the effect
of change in cost per mile by fuel efficiency quartile.
While our data are rich, one shortcoming of our data is that a vehicle can exit our data for a
number of reasons. For one, it might be retired while still capable of being used; the decision of
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interest. Second, it could have been scrapped as a result of an accident. Third, it might move to a
county that does not require smog tests. Finally, it might leave the state. These final three reasons
for exit present a difficulty for us. Insofar as they are correlated with gas prices, we will tend to
over or under predict the effect of changes in gas prices on scrappage decisions. Below we discuss
empirical evidence that suggests our results are likely lower bounds on how increases in gasoline
prices increase fleet fuel economy by changing the scrappage decisions of owners of existing vehicles.
Table 2 reports the results. Model 1 estimates the scrappage of vehicles that are over 15 years
old and includes only the dollars per mile of the vehicle as the key regressor along with a dummy for
whether the vehicle is a truck, the polynomial in the odometer reading, year fixed effects, vintage
fixed effects and make fixed effects. Model 2 splits the effect of dollars per mile by the whether the
vehicle falls in the first, second, third, or fourth fuel economy quartile.4 Because these coefficients
represent changes in the baseline hazard, coefficients smaller than one represent decreases in the
probability of scrappage when the respective variable increases.
Both Models 1 and 2 suggest that increases in the per mile cost of driving reduces the chances
a vehicle is scrapped. Specifically, Model 1 suggests that a 5 cent increase in the cost per mile
of driving reduces the chances all vehicles are scrapped by roughly 12 percent. When we split
this effect by fuel economy quartile, there is some evidence that this effect is strongest for the top
three fuel economy quartiles. That is, low fuel efficient vehicles become relatively more likely to be
scrapped.
There are at least two explanations for why higher gas prices may lower the likelihood a vehicle
is scrapped. First, there may be an income effect, in the sense that as gas prices increase vehicles
stay on the road longer as consumers have less disposable income to buy newer vehicles. Second,
and somewhat related, the propensity to sell a vehicle might fall as gas prices increase. As noted
above, because in our data “scrappage” will also capture vehicles moving from counties that require
smog checks to those that don’t, as such as the number of transactions fall, this will be expressed
as a reduction in scrappage. We find evidence of this when looking at the probability of being
“scrapped” of vehicles between 6 and 9 years old. For these vehicles, as gas prices increase their
probability of being scrapped, where scrappage likely reflects the chances of being sold to a county
that does not require a smog test, falls. Given this, we view these estimates as lower bounds on
how gas prices affects the retirement decisions of our at-risk category.
4We define the quartiles across the entire sample, but the results are robust to defining them within year as well.
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The first two models only allow the baseline hazard to depend on make, vintage and whether
the vehicle is a car or truck. Within a make, there is a lot of heterogeneity in terms of the longevity
of a vehicle within manufacturer and model year. To account for this, the last two models stratify
by make, model, model year, engine, and transmission.
Model 3 constrains the dollar per mile effect to be constant across fuel efficiencies. The results
are similar to model 1. However, when we allow the cost effect to differ by fuel-efficiency quartile,
we find much larger heterogeneity. In addition despite the likelihood that the level of these effects
are likely biased downward, we find that as gas prices increase the lowest fuel efficiency quartile
vehicles are more likely to be scrapped. While the highest fuel efficient vehicles are much less likely
to be scrapped compared to model 2.
We note that the right hand side variable is the dollars per mile, therefore the fact that we find
heterogeneity across fuel efficiency quartiles implies that to incentivize a low fuel efficiency vehicle
to exit requires a smaller change in gasoline prices than a high fuel efficiency vehicle. To put these
estimates into perspective, the average fuel efficiency of a bottom quartile vehicle is 16.7 MPG. A
one dollar increase in gasoline prices increases the cost per mile of these vehicles by roughly 6 cents.
Therefore, because our coefficients are scaled for a 5 cent change in the cost per mile, a one dollar
increase in gas prices increases the chance a bottom quartile vehicle is scrapped by approximately
15 percent.5 The average fuel efficiency of a fourth quartile vehicle is 30.3 MPG, implying a one
dollar increase in gas prices, increases the cost per mile of these vehicles by 3.3 cents. Therefore a
one dollar increase in gas prices reduces the chances a top-quartile vehicle is scrapped by roughly
45 percentage point.
5.2 Intensive Margin
We next estimate how gasoline prices affect the intensive margin. To do this, we calculate the
change in the odometer reading between biennial tests for each vehicle and the average gasoline
prices during the two years between tests. This leaves roughly 1.8 million observations in our 10
percent sample.
As with the hazard model, we vary the set of fixed effects included. The key independent
variable is either the log of gasoline prices (Table 3) or the of log dollars per mile (Table 4). Model
5Again, the Cox model is not linear, but for small changes around coefficients scaled for a 5 cent change the error
is likely small.
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1 in Table 3 includes just year fixed effects, vintage fixed effects and a truck indicator variable.
The results suggest a VMT elasticity of 0.442. It is important to note that while we are using
within year variation in gasoline prices, because we are estimating the effect of a 1 percent change
in gasoline prices over the entire two year period, these estimates represent fairly long run elasticity.
We believe that this makes these results unique in the sense that the individual level data allow us
to estimate long run elasticities without aggregating the time series of the data (e.g., this would
be infeasible if use average yearly California consumption over a two-year period). Because of this,
these estimates are larger than recent estimates of short run elasticities (e.g., Hughes, Knittel, and
Sperling (2008)). Model 2 adds manufacturer fixed effects to Model 1. The results change very
slightly. Model 3 allows the elasticity to vary by fuel efficiency quartile and finds very similar results
across quartiles.
Models 4 and 5 include make/model/engine/model year fixed effects. The average elasticities
changes very little, but a significant amount of heterogeneity exists. The top quartile vehicles’
elasticity is less than half that of bottom quartile vehicles. One potential explanation for this is
that we observe within household substitution from the fuel inefficient vehicles to the fuel efficient
vehicles. We are exploring this in current work.6 Another potential explanation is that a given
change in gasoline prices implies a larger change in the cost per mile for fuel inefficient vehicles.
But, we note that the rich fixed effects in Models 4 and 5 imply that we are looking within vehicle
type. Indeed, Table 4 suggests that when we do not account for the vehicle type (Models 2 through
3) the results with the log of gasoline prices and the log of cost per mile differ considerably.7
6 Conclusions
This paper estimates how changes in gasoline prices effect both the extensive and intensive margins
of automobile use. We find significant effects on scrapping decisions, new vehicle purchase decisions,
and miles travelled. The results highlight the variety of avenues through which carbon pricing
policies may affect emissions from the transportation sector.
6This is consistent with the household bargaining that took place for one of the authors.
7Because they include vehicle-type fixed effects, Models 4 and 5 are identical across the two specifications.
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Appendix
1 Figures
Figure 1: Average Fuel Economy of New Vehicles Registered in California
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Figure 2: Average Fuel Economy for Vehicles with Model Years of 1984, 1986, 1988, and 1990 over
Time
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Figure 3: Average Miles Driven per Day and Gasoline Prices
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
3.
5
Re
al 
Ga
so
lin
e 
Pr
ice
20
22
24
26
Mi
les
 p
er
 D
ay
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Time
Miles per Day Gas Price
13
Figure 4: Distribution of Miles Driven per Day in 1998 and 2008
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2 Tables
Year Count MPG VMT/day Gasoline Price Cents/Mile
1998 661,729 23.92 33.42 1.52 7.31
1999 512,168 23.98 34.62 1.75 7.74
2000 869,975 23.78 30.84 2.09 8.45
2001 791,347 23.77 31.95 1.95 8.48
2002 788,716 23.56 29.40 1.82 8.49
2003 809,615 23.45 30.30 2.04 9.30
2004 1119371 23.29 28.07 2.38 10.59
2005 833,477 23.30 28.88 2.71 12.02
2006 953,961 23.17 27.23 3.02 13.33
2007 877,855 23.16 27.32 3.10 14.27
2008 959,873 23.05 25.84 3.71 14.73
2009 799,774 23.06 26.27 2.45 14.37
Table 1: Means of Greenhouse Gas Emission-related Variables
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Dollars per Mile 0.882** 0.872**
(0.005) (0.024)
Dollars per Mile * MPG Quartile 1 0.862** 1.119**
(0.007) (0.034)
Dollars per Mile * MPG Quartile 2 0.841** 0.892**
(0.009) (0.028)
Dollars per Mile * MPG Quartile 3 0.837** 0.592**
(0.010) (0.021)
Dollars per Mile * MPG Quartile 4 0.840** 0.314**
(0.012) (0.014)
Truck 0.778** 0.776** 0.815**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.041)
Odometer 0.936 0.936 0.927 0.925
(0.054) (0.054) (0.057) (0.057)
Odometer2 1.560** 1.557** 1.607** 1.607**
(0.076) (0.076) (0.084) (0.084)
Odometer3 0.816** 0.817** 0.806** 0.806**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Odometer4 1.037** 1.037** 1.039** 1.039**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Odometer5 0.997** 0.997** 0.997** 0.997**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Odometer6 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Gross Polluter 1.127** 1.126** 1.099** 1.103**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Failed in the Past 1.491** 1.488** 1.409** 1.383**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Time Trend 1.001+ 1.000 1.021** 1.020**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Time Trend Squared 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Vintage Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stratified on Make Yes Yes -- --
Stratified on VIN Prefix No No Yes Yes
Observations 676321 676322 676323 676324
Table 2: Probability of Exit as a Function of Gasoline Prices – Cox Proportional Hazard Model
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